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Abstract
Creating private property rights and establishing land mar-
kets were fundamental to the historical development of
capitalism in the Global North and remain at the centre of
capitalist development in the Global South. This article con-
tributes to debates about these processes by analysing the
relationship between land markets and indigenous peoples
in Highland Ecuador. Building on Karl Polanyi's concept of
fictitious commodities, it elaborates a new concept that
makes an analytical distinction between the activation and
development of land markets. The former refers to the occa-
sional participation of actors in markets to secure land,
whereas the latter relates to the establishment and expan-
sion of markets that regulate the distribution and value of
land through market prices. Focusing on indigenous land
struggles in the late 20th century, this article shows that the
activation of land markets created opportunities for indige-
nous peasants to secure land, whereas the development of
land markets closed them down. Social and class differentia-
tion among the highland indigenous population increased
through this contradictory process. The article connects this
historical analysis to recent developments in Ecuador to
contribute to empirical and theoretical debates about con-
temporary land struggles and agrarian change elsewhere in
the Global South.
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‘To isolate [land] and form a market for it was perhaps the weirdest of
all the undertakings of our ancestors’
Karl Polanyi
1 | INTRODUCTION
Creating private property rights and establishing land markets were fundamental to the historical development of
capitalism in the Global North and remain at the centre of capitalist development and agrarian change in the Global
South. In Latin America, although private property rights were introduced during the colonial period, the develop-
ment of land markets was a more recent phenomenon. The exchange of land through markets started to increase in
the late 19th century, especially in zones closely connected to rapidly expanding world markets, but did not become
widespread across the region until the 20th century as traditional haciendas and plantations unravelled and capitalist
modernization advanced. Contrary to neoclassical economic theory, this process involved sustained state interven-
tion and intense social struggle. Hence, land markets followed diverse paths, with social, political and economic fac-
tors influencing their trajectories and dynamics.
Ecuador exemplifies this historical process.1 Land market activity started to increase in the early 20th century,
before accelerating from the 1960s as land reform triggered the widespread sale and purchase of rural land, espe-
cially in the highlands (Martínez, 1985; Thurner, 1989). The threat of expropriation through land reform prompted
highland landowning elites to divide their estates and offer land for sale. Meanwhile, linking private property rights
to the economic use of land, a key feature of Ecuadorian land reform, encouraged them to treat land as a commodity
and subject it to economic valuation. Indigenous and mestizo peasants, who were often forced to purchase land
through the market because of the limited amount redistributed through land reform, pressured landowning elites
to sell, which further stimulated land market activity. Private property rights spread as land purchases accelerated
and private land titles were issued through land reform and colonization (Food and Agriculture Organization
[FAO], 1995, 2002).
The diffusion of private property rights, the promotion of the economic valuation of land, and the capitalist mod-
ernization of agriculture created a strong platform for the expansion of land markets under land reform. The con-
tested end of reform in the 1990s started a new cycle of land commodification as restrictions on the exchange of
private land were removed, the threat of expropriation was eliminated, and the division of communal land was facili-
tated (Bretón, 1997; Goodwin, 2017). Capital poured into the agriculture sector and land market activity increased,
including the exchange of land for commercial activities, like urban development and rural tourism (Gascón, 2016;
Guerrero, 2004).
Yet the outcome was not the full incorporation of private land into the market. Rather, a hybrid land regime
emerged, with landowning elites, medium-sized farmers and agroindustrialists primarily subjecting land to economic
1My analysis of the Ecuadorian case draws on interviews with representatives of highland indigenous communities, organizations and movements, state
agencies and non-governmental organizations as well as agricultural censuses, agrarian legislation, government reports, newspaper archives, informal
conversations, personal observations, and a wide range of secondary sources in English and Spanish. Most of this research was conducted during fieldwork
in Ecuador between 2009 and 2011. However, my analysis also draws on supplementary research undertaken during several visits to Ecuador between
2015 and 2019.
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valuation and exchanging it at market prices, and mestizo and, especially, indigenous peasants tending to assign alter-
native meanings and values to land and largely circulating it through family and community institutions. Thus, in the
late 20th century, land markets coexisted with alternative forms of exchange, which were underpinned by different
practices and relations (Goodwin, 2017).
In this article, I explore this historical process by analysing indigenous efforts to secure land through the market
during land reform in the late 20th century.2 I elaborate a new concept to understand this process which makes an
analytical distinction between two dimensions of the land market: activation and development. The former refers to
the occasional participation of actors in markets to secure land. The latter relates to the construction and expansion
of markets that regulate the distribution of land through market prices and enable and promote the economic valori-
zation of land. I show that these two processes occurred simultaneously under land reform, with activation creating
spaces for indigenous peasants to obtain land and development closing them down.
In developing the activation-development concept, I take inspiration from Karl Polanyi, especially his claim that
land is a ‘fictitious commodity’ that cannot be reduced to a factor of production or item of exchange
(Polanyi, 1944/2001).3 Land, as Polanyi urges, ‘invests man's life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a
condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 187). Hence, it has
important non-economic dimensions, including social, political, spiritual and ecological. This suggests that even if
individuals or families purchase land on the market and secure private property rights, they will not necessarily treat it
as a commodity and subject it to strict economic valuation.4 I will argue that this was generally the case for highland
indigenous peasants in Ecuador in the late 20th century. The private land they secured through the activation of the
land market was wrapped up in a long-term social and political struggle and performed multiple non-economic
functions. Thus, it was generally not reducible to a commodity freely available for exchange on the market. Rather,
indigenous peasants tended to circulate private land through inheritance and marriage (e.g., the formal transfer of land
to children following the death of the head of the household) and buying and selling between family and community
members (e.g., the sale of land to a member of the same community). The exchange of this land was generally, if not
universally, regulated through communal authorities and relations, which were underpinned by organizational struc-
tures indigenous communities developed around the Ley de Comunas (Registro Oficial [RO] 558,1937). This law was
originally introduced in the 1930s to govern indigenous peoples; however, it provided indigenous communities with a
tool to strengthen communal organization and challenge the elite and the state in the late 20th century.
Establishing legally recognized communities, which was the dominant but not universal pattern in the highlands,
was part of a broader process of collective organization that helped activate land markets. Collective mobilization
prized open markets and created space for indigenous peoples to obtain land. Protests, occupations and strikes were
among the visible tactics indigenous peasants employed to encourage elites to sell them land. Collective mobilization
was also used to pressure the state to increase the regulation of land markets through land reform (Goodwin, 2017).
Hence, while indigenous peasants were tapping into markets to obtain land at the local level, they were mobilizing to
limit the reach and influence of land markets at the national level. I argue that these two features of highland indige-
nous mobilization were part of a ‘countermovement’ that aimed to decommodify land by regulating and delimiting
land markets and protecting and expanding alternative forms of organization and exchange (Goodwin, 2017, 2018;
Polanyi, 1944/2001). However, indigenous engagement in land markets in the late 20th century increased social and
class differentiation within the highland indigenous population, which ultimately weakened the countermovement
and decreased the possibility of broad-based land mobilizations occurring in the early 21st century
(Bretón, 2015a, 2015b; Goodwin, 2017; Henderson, 2017, 2018). Thus, I do not offer a static—or essentialized—
interpretation of indigenous resistance but argue indigenous peasants and movements evolved as market capitalism
advanced.
2For details on the size, distribution and evolution of the highland indigenous population in the late 20th century, see Zamosc (1995).
3Polanyi's definition of ‘land’ is broad, including various elements of nature. In this essay, I adopt a narrower reading, focusing on the integration of land
into markets. More broadly, I follow the exposition of Polanyian social theory I outline elsewhere (Goodwin, 2018).
4Numerous scholars have recognized this point in relation to rural land and property in other contexts. See, for example, Ferguson (1985), Gudeman (2001)
and Li (2014).
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In making this argument, I both support and challenge Polanyian social theory.5 On the one hand, I show that
land markets are shaped by social and political as well as economic forces (Topik, 1999). The land market that
emerged in the Ecuadorian Andes in the late 20th century was not the atomized market imagined by neoclassical
economic theory. Sustained state intervention was required to create and maintain the market and social and politi-
cal factors influenced both the supply of and demand for land. For example, the decision of elites to bring land on to
the market was strongly influenced by indigenous mobilization and was therefore not simply a response to changes
in market prices and conditions. I also show that land has multiple non-economic dimensions, highlighting the rele-
vance of the fictitious commodities concept and cautioning against reducing land conflicts to purely material strug-
gles. Furthermore, I demonstrate that markets exist alongside other spheres of exchange in capitalist societies, with
mechanisms based on alternative relations and practices coexisting with land markets in the rural highlands
(Goodwin, 2017; Polanyi, 1957). On the other hand, I argue that when combined with collective mobilization and
state intervention, land markets created opportunities for indigenous peasants to obtain land and, in some cases,
reverse historical processes of colonization and dispossession. I also show that land commodification sets in motion
changes that can limit resistance to the market over the long run, highlighting the need to historize and contextualize
land commodification and recognize the complexity and heterogeneity of the process (Goodwin, 2018;
Levien, 2007; Li, 2014; Nair, 2019).
In addition to making an original contribution to debates about Polanyian social theory, this article also provides
fresh insight into land markets and agrarian change. The existing scholarship on the Ecuadorian case provides consid-
erable insight into land markets and struggles at the local level (e.g., Forster, 1989; Martínez, 1985; Thurner, 1989).
However, there has been no serious attempt to draw out broader patterns and consider how land markets evolve
over time. Moreover, the dual role land markets performed for highland indigenous peasants in the late 20th
century—simultaneously creating and reducing opportunities to obtain land—has not been properly explored or con-
ceptualized. Although I use the activation-development concept to explore a specific social and historical context
and make no claims about its wider validity, it might offer broader insights into land markets, especially in Latin
America where colonial legacies, indigenous struggles and peripheral capitalism have fused to create distinct agrarian
trajectories. The analysis I present in this article also contributes to debates about rural land and agrarian change
elsewhere in the Global South (e.g., Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Li, 2014; Lavers, 2018).
The rest of this essay is structured as follows. I start by briefly explaining the links between land reform and land
markets in Highland Ecuador, showing how land reform simultaneously stimulated and regulated land market activ-
ity. I then explore indigenous participation in land markets in the late 20th century, arguing that the activation of land
markets opened spaces for highland indigenous peasants to obtain land, whereas the development of land markets
closed them down. I conclude by connecting these historical processes to contemporary developments and drawing
out broader implications for land struggles and agrarian change in the early 21st century.
2 | LAND MARKETS AND LAND REFORM IN HIGHLAND ECUADOR IN
THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The fictional status of land as commodity obligates capitalist states to create, maintain and regulate land markets
(Polanyi, 1944/2001). Hence, they do not emerge spontaneously through exchanges between individual actors but
require substantial state intervention to bring them into being and maintain them over the long run. This includes dis-
solving or weakening alternative forms of exchange and creating and maintaining a legal and bureaucratic framework
to protect and promote private property rights and facilitate and regulate market exchange. Thus, capitalist states
perform a dual role in land commodification, simultaneously promoting and regulating the process (Goodwin, 2017).
5The Polanyian literature is vast. See, for example, Hann and Hart (2009), Munck (2013), Sandbrook (2014), Goodwin (2018) and Dale, Holmes, and
Markantonatou (2019).
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In the late 20th century, the Ecuadorian state used various mechanisms to perform this dual role, but land
reform was the most decisive. Reform, which started in 1964 and ended in 1994, involved the abolition of traditional
peasant-patron practices and the redistribution and regulation of agricultural and pastoral land. Its direct impact was
limited: Only around 12% of the highland agricultural land surface was redistributed (Goodwin, 2017). However, its
indirect effect was enormous, gradually eliminating traditional peasant-patron practices, dismantling the traditional
hacienda complex and accelerating the capitalist modernization of agriculture.
One important feature of this agrarian transformation was the expansion of land markets. Land reform triggered
a series of interconnected processes that enabled the market to perform a greater role in the distribution and valua-
tion of land, while also generating contestation over the reach and operation of land markets. The rest of this
section is dedicated to explaining these processes, focusing on the five dimensions outlined in Table 1. The primary
aim is to provide the backdrop for the analysis of the activation and development of land markets in the next section.
However, this section also provides insight into the relationship between land reform and land markets, a topic that
has received relatively little scholarly attention outside the market-based land reforms that were introduced across
the Global South in 1990s and 2000s (Borras, 2003; Cottyn, 2018).
First, the central aim of Ecuadorian land reform was to dissolve traditional peasant-patron practices and acceler-
ate the capitalist modernization of agriculture (Bretón, 1997; Chiriboga, 1988; Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo
Agrícola [CIDA], 1965). Eliminating these practices ruptured the traditional hacienda complex and stimulated peasant
demand for land through the market. The most common and important traditional practice in the highlands,
huasipungo, involved peasant families exchanging their collective labour power for usufruct rights to land. A combina-
tion of social, political and economic factors combined to weaken huasipungo in the 1950s, and some landowning eli-
tes started to sell land to peasants to dissolve the practice at this stage, especially in the northern highlands, which
were close to rapidly expanding domestic markets (Barsky, 1988; Becker, 2008; Guerrero, 1984). Land reform then
generalized this process and helped erode huasipungo and other peasant-patron practices in the 1960s and 1970s.
Some huasipungueros secured land through land reform, whereas others purchased it directly from hacendados
(Barsky, 1988; Goodwin, 2017).
Thus, from the late 20th century, the traditional route for highland peasants to secure land was steadily closed,
making them increasingly reliant on land markets. The size and quality of the plots most former huasipungueros
obtained set limits on their capacity to redistribute land to family members over the long run (Martínez, 2002;
Muratorio, 1980).6 The scarcity of communal land also meant most community authorities lacked the capacity to
redistribute land to community members (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería [MAG], 1977; Martínez, 2002).
TABLE 1 Land reform and land markets in Highland Ecuador (1964–1994)
Land reform dimension Land market effects
Proscription of traditional peasant-patron
practices with limited land redistribution
Stimulated peasant demand for land through the market
Diffusion of private property rights Supported the exchange of land through markets
Conditioning private property rights on economic
use of land
Promoted economic valuation of land and its circulation through
markets
Stimulation of indigenous and peasant
organization
Increased pressure on landowning elites to sell land to peasant
families and communities
Regulation of private property and land markets Regulated land market activity and created a site of struggle over
the reach and operation of land markets
6On average, huasipungueros received 4ha of land through land reform (Goodwin,2017). In some cases, however, they secured considerably more. The
difference in the size and quality of plots huasipungueros received largely reflected the inequality that existed among peasants on traditional highland
haciendas. See, for example, Martínez (1984), Bretón (2015a,2015b), Goodwin (2017) and Martínez and Martínez (2019).
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Although many indigenous communities secured collective titles to land through land reform, the total stock of com-
munal land remained limited. Moreover, the bulk of this land was páramo, high-altitude grassland, which is generally
not suitable for cultivation, especially over the long run.7 Meanwhile, the limited amount of land redistributed
through land reform increased demand through the market, particularly in regions without state-owned haciendas.8
Hence, when land reform accelerated the dissolution of the traditional hacienda complex, peasants faced difficulties
obtaining land through family, community and state institutions and became increasingly dependent on land markets
to maintain their rural livelihoods.
Second, although private property rights were widespread before land reform commenced, private land owner-
ship spread as peasant-patron practices unravelled and land titles proliferated.9 Usufruct rights were converted into
private property rights, and formal land titles were issued through land reform. This included collective titles granted
to communities and cooperatives; however, the bulk were issued to families.10 Moreover, most collective titles
issued to cooperatives were ultimately converted into private titles (Martínez, 1995, 1998; Martínez &
Martínez, 2019; Santana, 1995). Meanwhile, some communal land was also formally divided into individual plots,
sometimes with the active involvement of state authorities (Forster, 1989; Martínez, 2002). Land titling took decades
to complete and thousands of peasants lacked formal land titles when land reform ended in the 1990s
(FAO, 1995, 2002).11 Yet, private land titles steadily increased in the late 20th century, which facilitated the
exchange of land through markets.
Third, land reform legislation conditioned private property rights on the economic use of land, which encouraged
elites to divide haciendas, sell underutilized or unproductive land and prioritize the economic dimensions of land. This
marked a radical break with the traditional agrarian economy. The traditional hacienda was a ‘total social fact’ that
encapsulated virtually every aspect of social life, including the cultural, religious, political and economic
(Mauss, 1925/2002). Thus, rural land performed multiple functions for elites, granting them social status, political
power, religious authority and economic stability (Lyons, 2006; Muratorio, 1980; Sylva, 1986). Conditioning private
property rights on economic use signalled the transition to an overtly capitalist agrarian economy that demanded
greater capital investment, intense land and water use, and increased agricultural production for domestic and interna-
tional markets (Bebbington, 2004). Land reform legislation issued in the early 1970s moved most decisively in this
direction, with the law demanding landowners use at least 80% of land efficiently and reach average productivity levels
or risk expropriation (RO 410, 1973). Supplementary legislation, bureaucratic ineffectiveness and elite capture
prevented these measures from ever being properly enforced, and little land was actually expropriated and
redistributed through the application of these clauses (Barsky, 1988; Chiriboga, 1988; Goodwin, 2017). Yet linking pri-
vate property rights to economic use encouraged elites to prioritize the economic dimensions of land, which stimulated
its exchange throughmarkets.
Fourth, land reform supported indigenous and peasant organization and this increased the pressure on hacenda-
dos to sell land. Although some elites happily sold land to peasants and reaped healthy profits in the process, others
were less enthusiastic and attempted to preserve their traditional status (Cervone, 2012; Guerrero, 1984;
Sylva, 1986). Indigenous and peasant mobilization was required to force recalcitrant elites to sell. Indigenous and
peasant communities, which multiplied under land reform, created a territorial and organizational base for this mobili-
zation (Korovkin, 1997; Macas, Belote, & Belote, 2003; Zamosc, 1995). Community councils (cabildos) provided a
mechanism to mobilize peasants within and between communities and coordinate mass occupations and protests.
Meanwhile, in the early 1970s, the establishment of the highland indigenous movement, Ecuarunari, and the
7Census data indicate approximately 10% of the highland agricultural land surface was under communal control in the early 1970s, nearly 50% of which
was classified as paramo and less than 15% deemed cultivable (INEC,1974).
8State-owned land was estimated to amount to 132,853ha at the start of land reform (CIDA,1965). The state secured the bulk of this land through the
expropriation of haciendas owned by the Catholic Church at the start of the 20th century. For insight into the redistribution of this land, see Goodwin
(2017).
9Agricultural census data give a sense of this increase: the proportion of private landholdings in the highlands increased from two-thirds to three-quarters
between 1974 and 2000, whereas the absolute number of private landholdings nearly doubled (INEC,1974,2000).
10In most cases, land titles were issued to male heads of households. On the gender dimensions of Latin American land reforms, see Deere (1987).
11Interview: Bureaucrat, Ministerio de Agricultura, Quito, December 7, 2011.
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radicalization of the national peasant movement, Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC) pro-
vided peasants with a stronger platform to pressure the elite and the state (Huarcaya, 2018; Sánchez-Parga, 2010;
Santana, 1995). The Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios, which was established in the 1940s, also remained active in
local land struggles until the early 1980s (Becker, 2008; Cervone, 2012; Goodwin, 2017). In the late 1980s, the baton
was passed to the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), which incorporated Ecuarunari
into a national movement and breathed new life into indigenous land struggles as the 20th century drew to a close
(Pallares 2002; Benavides, 2004; Cervone, 2012).
Fifth, although land reform stimulated land commodification, it also placed some restrictions on the operation of
land markets. Regulation, which peaked in the early 1970s, included overseeing the division, transfer and sale of agricul-
tural land, both inside and outside the reform sector. For example, officially, land reform beneficiaries required authoriza-
tion from the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonization (IERAC) before dividing and exchanging their land
(RO 297, 1964; RO 410, 1973). From the early 1970s, technically, IERAC was also responsible for overseeing the division
of rural landholdings to ensure it remained within ‘the spirit of the law’ (RO 410, 1973). However, these regulations were
poorly enforced and easily circumvented, meaning actual land market regulation was significantly weaker than implied
by the formal legal and bureaucratic framework. Indigenous and peasant movements repeatedly pushed for greater regu-
lation through the enforcement of existing legislation and the introduction of new land laws (Goodwin, 2017). The state's
repeated failure to respond to their demands supported the uneven accumulation of land through the market and deep-
ened the inequalities that were created or embedded through the partial implementation of land reform.
Land market regulation weakened further in the 1990s after the introduction of Ley de Desarrollo Agrario. The
law, which was actively promoted by international development agencies, boasted the ‘sale and purchase and trans-
fer of privately-owned agricultural land are free and require the authorization of no one’ (RO 55,1997). The division
of communal land was also facilitated, even if mass indigenous mobilization forced the Durán Ballén government to
revise its original proposals and increase the proportion of community members required to vote to divide communal
land (excluding páramo) to two-thirds (RO 55, 1997; RO 315, 2004; Bretón, 1997; Martínez, 1998; Goodwin, 2017).
The introduction of Ley de Desarrollo Agrario started a new phase of land commodification as domestic and global
capital poured into the agricultural sector and the economic valorization of land intensified (FAO, 1995;
Guerrero, 2004; Martínez, 1998). Yet, viewed in historical perspective, the law was one step in a longer term process
of land commodification, which started to accelerate after the introduction of land reform in the 1960s.
To sum up, land reform both stimulated and constrained land markets but moved far more decisively in the
direction of the former than the latter, meaning the activation and development of land markets took place within a
weak regulatory framework that favoured landowning elites, medium-sized farmers and agroindustrialists. The next
section explores this process, explaining the spaces that opened and closed for highland indigenous peasants to pur-
chase land as the capitalist modernization of agriculture advanced.
3 | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LAND MARKETS IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: ACTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Land reform enabled the market to perform a greater role in the use, valuation and distribution of land in the late
20th century; however, it also converted the land market into a site of social and political struggle. Indigenous efforts
to secure land through the market were emblematic of this broader process. In this section, I explore these struggles
through the lens of the activation-development concept outlined in the introduction to this article. Drawing on sev-
eral cases, I argue that the activation of land markets opened spaces for indigenous peasants to acquire land,
whereas the development of land markets closed them down. I also show that social and class differentiation
increased among the highland indigenous population through unequal participation in the land market.
The section starts by briefly outlining highland indigenous land relations in the late 20th century, explaining the
role family and community institutions performed in regulating the exchange of land and the factors that contributed
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to the fictional status of land as commodity for indigenous peasants. The analysis then turns to indigenous efforts to
purchase land through the market, starting in the 1960s and 1970s before moving on to the 1980s and 1990s.
3.1 | Highland indigenous land relations in the late twentieth century
Highland indigenous land relations took specific social, historical and political forms in the late 20th century. Land
tenure on rural indigenous communities was largely based on private ownership, with indigenous families securing
plots of land through various mechanisms, including land reform and land markets. Family plots were generally
divided and subdivided between family members through inheritance and marriage (Belote, 1984; Martínez, 2002;
Sánchez-Parga, 1984). The timing and mode of the transfer of land depended on various factors including, local cus-
toms and practices, the amount and quality of land available, the size and age of the family, and the productive strat-
egies of the family unit. Land was generally redistributed among sons and daughters sometimes before but usually
after the death of the head of the household.12 Before land was definitively transferred through inheritance, adult
children generally lacked formal land titles but usually enjoyed access to family land, which strengthened relations of
dependence and reciprocity across generations and increased the productive capacity of the family unit. Yet the lim-
ited amount of land available to most indigenous families made it difficult for them to absorb family labour over the
long run, which encouraged young indigenous peasants to turn to the market to obtain land. Marriage provided fur-
ther opportunities for them to access land. Where sufficient land was available, heads of households usually ceded
small plots to young married couples, although newly formed families generally lacked autonomous control of the
land until it was formally transferred through inheritance. The allocation of land through marriage sometimes pro-
vided opportunities for extended indigenous families to gain access to land in different ecological zones, minimize
the risk of crop failure and diversify agricultural production. However, this traditional Andean practice proved diffi-
cult to sustain as family plots became increasingly fragmented. The distribution of land through marriage also
strengthened ties between families within and between communities, enmeshing indigenous peasants within a
broader web of family and community relations.
In some cases, members of highland indigenous families also enjoyed usufruct rights to communal land, espe-
cially páramo, which was mostly used for pasture and sometimes for cultivation (MAG, 1977; Martínez, 1998).
Hence, private and communal land tenures often coexisted on highland indigenous communities (Martínez, 2002;
Pacari, 1993). However, as noted above, communal land was scarce, and many indigenous communities lacked col-
lective titles to agricultural or pastoral land.13 Yet, even in these cases, community institutions still influenced the dis-
tribution of land, with the buying and selling of private land generally, if not universally, regulated through communal
relations and authorities (FAO, 1995). The sale and purchase of land in indigenous communities took multiple forms
and included various actors. In most cases, it involved transactions between members of the same community, with
community members deciding to sell land for diverse reasons, including permanent migration and economic distress.
Land was also sometimes sold to members of the same family following the division of family plots through inheri-
tance. In other cases, indigenous peasants exchanged land with members of neighbouring indigenous communities
or occasionally sold land to mestizo peasants or middlemen (Belote, 1984).
Ley de Comunas, which was first introduced in 1937, supported the communal regulation of land (RO 558,
1937).14 To register as a comuna, communities were required to establish a community council (cabildo) and declare
collective goods (bienes colectivos or bienes en comun), including, where applicable, communal agricultural and
12For a vivid visual representation of the fragmentation of land in a highland indigenous community in the 20th century, see Iturralde (1980, pp. 125–129).
See also Sánchez-Parga (1984, pp. 168–170).
13For example, Martínez (2002, p. 41) reports that in the late 1970s, 250 of 1,318 legally registered highland peasant communities owned communal land,
and the bulk of this land was divided into family usufructuary plots.
14For further insight into indigenous engagement with the Ley de Comunas, see Santana (1995), Becker (1999), Martínez (1992,2002), Lucero (2003), Ibarra
(2004), Colloredo-Mansfield (2009), and Rayner (2017).
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pastoral land.15 The law stated that bienes colectivos belonged to all members of the community and charged the
cabildo with the task of governing them. Hence, the cabildo's main task was to oversee communal property. How-
ever, as Santana (1995) notes, the legal framework provided plenty of scope for intervention in other areas. For
example, the cabildo was expected to defend the territorial integrity of the community, which created space for the
regulation of private as well as communal land. Moreover, indigenous communities tended to blend the formal
requirements of the law with local customs and practices to create distinct, vernacular forms of communal organiza-
tion (Colloredo-Mansfield, 2009; Korovkin, 1997; Rayner, 2017).16 Thus, the communal authorities and relations that
regulated land varied between indigenous communities. The degree of communal influence over the exchange of pri-
vate land depended on multiple factors, including the internal statutes and rules of the comuna and the power and
legitimacy of the cabildo. In some cases, individuals and families enjoyed considerable autonomy, whereas in others
community authorities exerted greater influence. In the 1990s, the Ley de Desarrollo Agrario challenged the cabildo's
authority to regulate the exchange of private land and created greater space for the division of communal land
(RO 55, 1997; RO 315, 2004). However, the Ley de Comunas provided indigenous communities with a tool to coun-
teract the liberalization of the land market and prevent or reduce the division of communal land (Martínez, 1998;
Rayner, 2017). Hence, indigenous communities were able to use the law to frustrate state efforts to erode the com-
munal regulation of land and expand the free exchange of land on the market.
Historical and political factors added to the uniqueness of indigenous land relations and supported the family
and community regulation of land in the late 20th century. Colonialism involved the steady dispossession of indige-
nous land, and this process weighed heavily on indigenous land politics (Benavides, 2004; Huarcaya, 2018;
Meisch, 1992; Pacari, 1993). The lived experiences of indigenous peasants on the traditional haciendas that emerged
out of colonialism were fundamental to indigenous collective memories. For example, describing life on a traditional
hacienda in Guamote, Chimborazo, one indigenous peasant told me ‘my mother and father could not obtain land so
they worked the land of the masters (amos), they were slaves of the masters (amos), serving them, cleaning their
backsides, cleaning their land, cleaning their buildings’.17 Collective memories of exploitation and oppression fused
with shared experiences of poverty, inequality and racism to provide a powerful basis for collective organization and
mobilization. Building on these memories and experiences, local and national indigenous leaders increasingly stressed
cultural distinctiveness and ethnic identities to strengthen collective organization and fuel land mobilizations
(Benavides, 2004; Cervone, 2012; Sánchez-Parga, 2010). The centrality of land to highland indigenous culture
supported these efforts, and land and cultural demands became increasingly enmeshed as the century drew to a
close. In turn, this underpinned attempts to build local indigenous autonomy and transform relations with the state.
Hence, land was central to a wider indigenous political project, which crystallized at the end of the 20th century in
demands to transform Ecuador into a plurinational state (Becker, 2012; Benavides, 2004; Rayner, 2017).
Social, historical and political factors therefore fused to create distinct indigenous land relations in the late 20th
century. Land was a crucial economic resource for indigenous peasants; however, it was also wrapped up in
long-term social and political struggles and performed various non-economic functions. Thus, indigenous peasants
tended to assign alternative meanings and values to land and not treat it as a full-blown commodity. The exchange
of the private land they secured through the activation of the land market was usually regulated through family and
community institutions rather than traded freely on the market. Yet indigenous land relations and struggles were
heavily influenced by the development of the land market, which regulated the distribution and value of land through
market prices. The following examples illustrate how this socially and spatially uneven process evolved under land
reform.
15See Lentz (1997, pp. 254–282) for an ethnohistorical analysis of the formation and evolution of a highland indigenous comuna in the 1970s and 1980s.
16Other indigenous communities shunned the law and remained outside the legal framework or took decades to register with the authorities
(Becker,1999). See also Santana (1995), Colloredo-Mansfield (2009), Cervone (2012) Rayner (2017).
17Interview: Community A, Guamote, Chimborazo, November 25, 2011.
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3.2 | Highland indigenous land market struggles in the late twentieth century
Two cases examined by William Waters (2007) in the northern highland province of Cotopaxi highlight the diverse
opportunities that emerged for indigenous peasants to purchase land under land reform. The first case revolved
around the division and dissolution of a traditional hacienda once owned by the former conservative president of
Ecuador, Gabriel Garcia Moreno (Waters, 2007, pp. 131–134). Descendants of the former president sold most of
their remaining land when land reform surged up the political agenda in the early 1960s. Reflecting broader changes
in the highland agrarian economy, Waters reports that the bulk of this land was sold to a new class of landowner
rather than the traditional landowning elite. The rest was granted or sold to indigenous peasant families who had
worked on the hacienda as huasipungueros. Land was sold at the family level. However, the indigenous families orga-
nized into a community, following the general pattern in the highlands. Along with a neighbouring community, the
families also secured collective ownership of 21,000 ha of páramo through negotiation with the land reform agency,
IERAC (Waters, 2007, p. 133). Through the subdivision of the hacienda in the 1960s and 1970s, indigenous peasants
obtained small plots of good quality land for cultivation as well as collective ownership of a huge tract of páramo for
pasture. Yet, as Waters notes, ‘a second generation of large- and medium-sized landowners emerged from the same
process and continued to occupy substantial amounts of highly productive land that remained out of the hands of
the indigenous community’ (Waters, 2007, p. 134).
Indigenous families involved in the division of the second hacienda analysed by Waters were less fortunate
(Waters, 2007, pp. 134–137). This hacienda was passed down through a wealthy highland family, before being sold
in the late 1940s to two urban business partners who took equal shares. In the mid-1960s, one of the partners liqui-
dated huasipungo through the transfer of land to former huasipungueros, who created a small community. Indicating
some differentiation among the indigenous families, Waters reports that the ‘parcels ranged in size from 0.3 to 1.9
hectares, averaging only 1.42 hectares’ (Waters, 2007, p. 135). During the next decade, the families augmented the
small pieces of land they obtained through the dissolution of huasipungo with the purchase of individual plots of cul-
tivable land and the collective acquisition of 1,529 ha of páramo. Thus, the land market provided them with opportu-
nities to secure land and combine private and communal land tenures. However, the cultivable land they purchased
was elevated and unproductive, receiving ‘virtually no irrigation water … and dominated by a heavy, unproductive
clay soil’ (Waters, 2007, p. 135). The best quality land was retained by the original hacendados and a veterinarian
from the nearby commercial city, Ambato, who purchased 349 ha in the 1970s. The outcome, as Waters explains,
was that the haciendas monopolized ‘not only the better lower lands, but also the most productive higher elevation
lands’ (Waters, 2007, p. 135).
Despite the different outcomes in the two cases, a similar pattern emerged. On the one hand, the breakdown of
the traditional hacienda and the activation of the land market created opportunities for indigenous peasants to
secure small plots of elevated cultivable land and large tracts of high-altitude pastoral land. On the other, the devel-
opment of the land market restricted indigenous access to the most productive land located at lower elevations, with
this land being sold to a new generation of landowning elite or retained by the original hacendados. Hence, the acti-
vation and development of land markets exhibited a distinct geographic pattern: indigenous peasants were generally
able to purchase more marginal land at higher elevations but were locked out the market for the best quality land
located along the floor of the Andean valley.
The case studied by Carola Lentz (1997) in the central highland province of Chimborazo paints a similar, if more
heterogenous, picture. The diversity of outcomes was linked to the land purchases that some indigenous peasant
families realized before land reform, with the income indigenous workers earned from temporary work on coastal
sugar plantations supporting land acquisitions, especially from the 1940s (Lentz, 1997, pp. 51–53). Lentz notes that
these early land purchases, which were facilitated by low market prices, were not the atomized, impersonal transac-
tions imagined by neoclassical economic theory. Rather, ‘they depended on a complex network of social relations:
the offer, the price, and the methods of payment depended to a large extent on the specific relations between the
community buyers and the landowner’ (Lentz, 1997, pp. 51–52). Personal relations therefore contributed to the
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heterogeneity of early land market outcomes, with some indigenous peasants exploiting their relations with the
hacendado and purchasing land on more favourable terms.
Lentz reports that the build-up to land reform in the early 1960s accelerated the dissolution of the hacienda and
increased the amount of land offered for sale (Lentz, 1997, pp. 54–59). The landowner's decision to liquidate
huasipungos before land reform facilitated his efforts to sell rather than grant land to huasipungueros: only two
huasipungueros received land in exchange for their labour on the traditional hacienda; the rest were evicted from
their landholdings and sold plots of more marginal land. Describing this process, one former indigenous worker
recalls: ‘In the end, people started to buy but they did not sell those huasipungos in the pamba. Where we are now,
on the slopes, here and down there they started to sell’ (Lentz, 1997, p. 54).
Land reform then accelerated the division of the hacienda. Lentz estimates a quarter of the land offered for sale
in the late 1960s was purchased by members of the indigenous community, with the rest purchased by members of
neighbouring communities or mestizos from a nearby town (Lentz, 1997, p. 56). However, the operation of the land
market started to work against the indigenous peasants in the late 1970s. Their refusal to work on the hacienda and
their decision to form a legally registered comuna contributed to the hacendado's decision to sell the remaining sec-
tions of the hacienda ‘piece by piece’ (Lentz, 1997, p. 57). Yet the landowner took advantage of the tightening of the
land market and offered land for sale at significantly higher prices. Lentz estimates that the prices the hacendado
demanded for the remaining sections of the hacienda were 50 times greater than the prices in the 1960s, whereas
the wages the indigenous workers received on coastal sugar plantations were only 10 times higher (Lentz, 1997,
p. 57). With few savings and limited incomes, indigenous peasants were effectively priced-out of the market. Hence,
the development of the land market progressively closed-down spaces for indigenous peasants to obtain land.
The process described by Lentz occurred elsewhere in the highlands as landowners exploited the market to max-
imize economic returns, frequently pitting one group of buyers against another to escalate prices (Huarcaya, 2018;
Martínez, 1984, 1985; Muratorio, 1980; Thurner, 1989, 2000). Luciano Martínez (1985), for example, shows the dif-
ficulties increasing land prices caused indigenous peasants in a small community in the central highland province of
Chimborazo. He argues that, although many indigenous families purchased small plots of land, the land market ulti-
mately ‘benefitted the landowners who bowed to peasant demands but obtained significant earnings from the sale
of their properties’ (Martínez, 1985, pp. 152–153). Hence, the exchange of land through the market embedded eco-
nomic inequalities between indigenous peoples and landowning elites. However, the obstacles in front of another
indigenous community he analyses in the northern highland province of Imbabura were far greater. There, land prices
largely, if not totally, blocked indigenous efforts to purchase land as medium- and large-sized haciendas monopolized
the best quality land (Martínez, 1985, pp. 154–156).
Market prices were also a considerable obstacle to the indigenous families I interviewed in a small community in
Chimborazo.18 The community members explained that it was only during the build-up to the introduction of the
second major land reform law in the early 1970s that local hacendados started to sell land to indigenous peasants on
a significant scale. Indigenous mobilization created additional pressure as strikes, protests and occupations occurred
across the province, creating ‘significant concern’ among local elites. The introduction of the law in 1973 and the
escalation of indigenous resistance prompted more elites to start selling land to indigenous peasants, most of whom
purchased small plots.
During this process, the community members were initially offered remote land located high on the slopes of
the Andean valley. However, this land was not suitable for cultivation. Instead, they purchased small plots of cultiva-
ble land lower down the valley but still a strenuous two-hour walk along a rocky path from the town centre and local
market. Each family pooled their resources and paid a small deposit and a series of annual instalments to the hacen-
dado. One community elder said that he later purchased another small extension of land from the daughter of the
hacendado, using resources secured through his extended family and wage labour: ‘we fixed the price, we paid it, and
we live in peace’.
18Interview: Community A, Guamote, Chimborazo, November 25, 2011.
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Yet market prices set definite limits on the quality and quantity of the land the indigenous families could pur-
chase. The community members said that indigenous peoples did not have the money to purchase the most produc-
tive land incorporated into the hacienda so the hacendados divided it between family members with ‘great ease’. By
way of example, one community member explained: ‘Dr Francisco Martínez, he took the section opposite called San
Rosa, and the sister Elena Martínez the section behind, another called Alfonso Martínez and the wives of some
hacendados, they took the section up to the bridge’.19 Hence, through the activation of the land market indigenous
families secured small plots of relatively marginal land. The best quality land, which remained under elite control in
the 1960s and 1970s, was available to purchase on the market but at a price that far exceeded the economic capac-
ity of indigenous families.
In this case, it was the broad build-up of indigenous and peasant mobilization that prompted landowners to start to
sell land. The cases studied by Mark Thurner (2000) in Chimborazo illustrate the more direct impact of indigenous
mobilization on land markets.20 Echoing Lentz, he describes how indigenous workers used the income they generated
from toiling on coastal sugar plantations to purchase land and reduce their dependence on the hacendado prior to land
reform (Thurner, 2000, pp. 364–365). Land reform then accelerated this process as a new generation of indigenous
leaders established a comuna to ‘defend and expand their control of land at the expense of the hacienda’ (Thurner,
2000, p. 366). However, although collective organization was central to land acquisitions, indigenous land purchases
were highly differentiated. Some securedmore land than others and employed other indigenous peasants to work their
land. Hence, participation in the landmarket contributed to class differentiation among indigenous peoples.
Events on a neighbouring hacienda followed a different trajectory. The estate was not divided until 1965when it was
split in two, with each half being sold separately in 1972: ‘One half went to the oldmayoral andmayordomowhile the other
half was sold to a mestizo compadre from a nearby village’ (Thurner, 2000, p. 367). Following the general trend, these land
sales reflected the ethnic division of labour on the traditional hacienda, that is, the best quality land was often purchased
by mestizos who held more powerful and well remunerated positions (e.g., Weismantel, 1989). However, indigenous
mobilization and resistance performed a crucial role in derailing the commodifying plans of one of the new landowners. His
later attempts to sell pastoral land attached to the hacienda were blocked by members of various local communities who
occupied the land and ultimately secured communal ownership of around half of it through the intervention of the land
reform agency, IERAC (Thurner, 2000, pp. 348 and 368). The development of the land market therefore locked out
indigenous peasants from themost productive sections of the hacienda. However, a combination of collectivemobilization
and state intervention blocked the full incorporation of pastoral land into the landmarket.
These cases show that the division of traditional haciendas and the capitalist modernization of agriculture in the
1960s and 1970s saw the exit of some landowners and the entrance of others (Barsky, 1988; Chiriboga, 1988;
Sylva, 1986; Waters, 2007). The new owners of the medium- and large-sized landholdings that emerged through this
process included the family members of traditional landowning elites, former hacienda administrators and managers,
and companies and investors attracted to the profits available from capitalist agriculture and land speculation.
Stripped of many of the non-economic functions land performed for elites in the traditional agrarian economy, the
economic dimensions of land became more central for this group of landowners, with the economic valorization of
land being realized through the market. Opportunities for indigenous peasants to acquire productive land were lim-
ited and most were restricted to purchasing relatively small plots of marginal land located at higher elevations.
Hence, although traditional haciendas disappeared and medium-sized farms proliferated, the land market embedded
underlying ethnic land inequalities, with the bulk of indigenous peoples remaining at the lower end of the land distri-
bution in the 1960s and 1970s (Goodwin, 2014).
This general pattern continued into the 1980s and 1990s as the development of the land market continued to
restrict opportunities for indigenous peasants to secure productive land, especially in regions where capital intensive
agroexport emerged. Yet indigenous organization and mobilization continued to prize open land markets. Thurner
19The names of the landowners have been changed.
20I gained additional insight into these cases through personal communication with Mark Thurner in London in February 2018. I am very grateful to Mark
for sharing his thoughts and memories with me.
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notes, for example, that land sales to indigenous peasants in Chimborazo, which remained highly heterogenous in
the 1980s, were ‘the indirect result of the social and political threats of invasion and expropriation made concrete in
labor indiscipline and other forms of local resistance’ (Thurner, 1989, p. 29). Emma Cervone provides further evi-
dence of this, with indigenous families in Tixan using occupations to persuade elites to sell them land
(Cervone, 2012, pp. 139–143). Indicating the power of this collective action and the political subjectivities it fos-
tered, she notes that ‘impressive numbers of indigenous peasants met on the seized properties to support and
encourage their comrades at different stages of the struggle’ and ‘land seizures became a rite of passage unde-
rscoring the birth of new political subjects’ (Cervone, 2012, pp. 142 and 144). Strikes, protests and occupations con-
tinued across the highlands in the 1980s and 1990s, with indigenous peasants maintaining the pressure on
landowners to sell as the possibilities of obtaining land through land reform became ever more remote
(Goodwin, 2017; Guerrero, 2004; Huarcaya, 2018).
The emergence and strengthening of the national indigenous movement, CONAIE, played a pivotal role in this
resistance, with the movement spearheading national mobilizations and supporting local land disputes in the 1980s
and 1990s (Rosero, 1990). The 1990 indigenous levantamiento—uprising—was particularly effective in unlocking land
markets and increasing indigenous control of land (FAO, 1995; Navarro, Vallejo, & Villaverde, 1996). The
levantamiento, which started with the occupation of the iconic Santo Domingo church in Quito, swept across
the highlands in early June 1990, causing considerable consternation among landowning elites, especially in
Chimborazo where land disputes were most intense and widespread (El Comercio, June 1, 1990: A-6; El Espectador,
June 6, 1990: 1–8; Rosero, 1990; Meisch, 1992; Zamosc, 1994; Korovkin, 1997).21 The 1994 levantamiento, which
was launched to challenge the introduction of Ley de Desarrollo Agrario, generated additional pressure and
ensured land remained high on the social and political agenda (El Comercio, June 3, 1994: 1; Bretón, 1997;
Sawyer, 2004; Goodwin, 2017). Some landowning elites stood firm against escalating indigenous pressure, but many
decided to sell, including productive land that was previously out of the reach of most indigenous families and
communities.
Yet, while collective organization enabled indigenous peasants to secure land through the activation of the land
market, the sharp economic downturn of the 1980s and 1990s complicated their efforts. On one hand, surging
unemployment and declining real wages undermined attempts to channel income from wage labour into land pur-
chases. On the other, rising agricultural input prices and falling demand for agricultural produce reduced incomes
from agricultural production. Hence, real incomes declined inside and outside the agricultural sector, limiting possibil-
ities to purchase land (Cervone, 2012; Jokisch, 2002).
The impact of the economic slump was compounded by escalating land prices as the land market continued to
tighten. FENOC, the national peasant movement, captures the dilemma facing peasants in the early 1980s:
Taking advantage of the scarcity of productive land, the understandable desire of the peasant to
acquire land, and the demographic pressure in minifundista zones, landowners have attempted to sell
their land at the price of gold … The growing imbalance between the price of land and the income of
minifundistas progressively diminishes the possibilities of transformation. (FENOC, 1984, p. 9)
Various factors contributed to escalating land prices during this period. First, the basic imbalance between supply
and demand placed general upward pressure on prices, especially as the rural population continued to grow despite
rapid urban migration (Forster, 1989; Korovkin, 1997; Thurner, 1989). Notably, pressure was most acute in zones
with high indigenous populations, which generally experienced less permanent migration (Kramkowski, 1989;
Zamosc, 1995). Second, revisions to land reform legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s strengthened the pro-
tection of private property rights, which reduced the threat of expropriation and increased the economic value of
21Interviews: Indigenous leader, December 14, 2018, Guamote; Regional Coordinator, FEPP, Riobamba, August 5, 2010.
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land (RO 792, 1979; Barsky, 1988; Navarro et al., 1996). Third, urbanization drove prices higher as land purchases
and speculation increased in rural areas located close to rapidly expanding towns and cities (Horn, 2018;
Rayner, 2017; Rosero, 1990). Fourth, the development of the agroexport sector significantly increased the economic
value of land, triggering rapid and sustained price increases (FAO, 1995; Guerrero, 2004; Navarro et al., 1996).
This last factor was particularly influential in shaping the dynamics of land markets in the highlands in 1980s and
1990s. Historically, agricultural export production in Ecuador was concentrated in the coastal region, whereas pro-
duction for the domestic market was located in the highlands. However, the frontiers of the agroexport sector
expanded in the 1980s and 1990s as the unravelling of land reform and the liberalization of trade and capital flows
encouraged greater investment in agroexport (FAO, 1995; Korovkin, 2004; Rubio, 2008). This was particularly evi-
dent in the northern highland provinces of Cotopaxi, Imbabura and Pichincha, where highly productive land, exten-
sive irrigation networks, favourable climatic conditions and good transport links attracted agroexporters in their
droves.
The rapid expansion of the cut flower industry was the starkest illustration of this wider trend. Flower planta-
tions started to spread in the late 1980s, before expanding rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s (El Comercio July
15, 1988: A-6; FAO, 1995). Elevated land prices and considerable capital and technological requirements precluded
the involvement of indigenous families as producers; the only space open to them to participate was as wage
labourers on flower plantations (Korovkin, 2004; Martínez, 2013; Rubio, 2008).22
Flower plantations were emblematic of the capital-intensive medium-sized farms that emerged in the highlands as
the traditional hacienda unravelled, with most ranging between 20 and 50 ha (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y
Censos [INEC], 2000). Crucially, however, land incorporated into the flower sector was among the most productive
and best irrigated in the highlands, revealing a new form of land inequality in which the quality rather than the quantity
of land was the key criteria. The basic pattern of land ownership that emerged in regions where flower plantations
expandedwas themonopolization of themost productive land located at lower elevations by national and international
flower producers and the restriction of indigenous and mestizo peasants to more marginal and less productive land at
higher elevations (FAO, 1995, p. 54). Hence, the sector reflected the broader social and spatial pattern of land owner-
ship that emerged across the highlands in the 1960s and 1970s. Indigenous peasants still purchased land through the
activation of the land market in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the development of the landmarket and the growth of
the agroexport sector generally prevented them from obtaining themost productive land.
The Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP) land purchase programme provides further insight into this
process (Bretón, 2008; Cervone, 2012; Navarro et al., 1996). The initiative, which supplied interest-bearing loans to
peasants to purchase land on the market in the early 1990s, responded to two main factors: the inability of peasants
to secure land via the market or land reform and the upsurge in rural land conflicts, social unrest and popular pro-
tests. The 1990 levantamiento forced religious authorities and state officials to act. Shortly after the uprising, the
Conferencia Episcopal Ecuatoriana reached agreement with the Borja government to purchase discounted public over-
seas debt, convert the debt into national currency and invest it into social programmes (Navarro et al., 1996,
pp. 280–282). One of the most important schemes was the Programa Nacional de Servicios Integrados a las Com-
unidades Indígenas, which received around a third of the total funds, 60% of which was channelled into the purchase
and legalization of land (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 62). The FEPP land purchase programme was part of this initiative.23
Landowning elites lobbied hard to ensure the programme protected or extended their economic interests,
including visiting FEPP offices and meeting state officials. This individual and collective pressure was reflected in the
inclusion of regulations that demanded ‘free and voluntary’ sales of land and purchases at ‘market prices without
subsidies’ (Navarro et al., 1996. p. 73). Hence, the programme resembled the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ market-
based land reform model promoted by the World Bank in the 1990s (Borras, 2003). But it did not follow the
22Interviews: Representative, Heifer, Cayambe, August 17, 2010; President, UNOPAC, Ayora, December 14, 2011; President, CODEMIA, Cayambe, August
17, 2010.
23Interestingly, the FEPP scheme resembled land market initiatives implemented elsewhere in Latin America in the 1990s; for example, in the wake of the
1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico. For critical reflections on this programme, see Bobrow-Strain (2004).
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economistic logic of this model. Indigenous and peasant pressure was required to force elites to sell and increase the
supply of land on the market. Moreover, the programme responded to decades of indigenous resistance and was
therefore inherently historical and political.
A full analysis of the FEPP programme is outside the scope of this essay; however, inspection of some of its main
characteristics provides further insight into the activation and development of land markets (Table 2). Three impor-
tant consequences of using market prices as barometers for land value followed for indigenous peasants.
First, purchases took place in the context of rapidly increasing land prices as landowners exploited the imbalance
between supply and demand to maximize returns (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 179). The programme contributed to this
general trend by converting latent indigenous demand into effective demand (Rosero, 1990, pp. 61–62; Navarro
et al., 1996, pp. 180–181). Elevated prices dissuaded some indigenous peoples from participating in the programme
and complicated their efforts to secure land through the market without FEPP support. The scheme therefore con-
tributed to differentiation among the highland indigenous population, with only a relatively small proportion willing
and able to participate. Furthermore, although loans were granted at attractive interest rates and generally repaid
quickly, elevated land prices saddled buyers with high levels of debt. (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 169). This sometimes
reduced the cohesion of indigenous communities as community members migrated to secure income to repay the
loans (Bretón, 2008).24
Second, market prices limited the amount of land incorporated into the programme, especially in regions where
capital-intensive agroexport took root. For instance, Navarro et al. note: ‘In the province of Imbabura, the land mar-
ket is restricted, and the prices are very high, especially in areas where there are enterprises that produce flowers for
export markets’ (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 164). Land purchase data provide further evidence. The average price of a
hectare of land purchased through the FEPP branch responsible for Imbabura was over four times higher than the
average price of land purchased through the Chimborazo office (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 178). The former purchased
3.3% of the total amount of land incorporated into the FEPP programme but absorbed 11.5% of total funds, whereas
the latter purchased 59.4% of land but absorbed 54% of funds (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 161). Hence, the develop-
ment of the land market set definite limits on indigenous access to land in regions where agroexporters operated.
Third, market prices also influenced the quality of land. The combination of indigenous activism and interest-
bearing loans enabled indigenous peasants to purchase good quality land in some cases. For example, the FEPP rep-
resentative I interviewed explained that the sections of the haciendas landowning elites decided to sell in the canton
TABLE 2 FEPP assisted land purchases in Highland Ecuador: 1990–1995
Province Organizations Members %a Land (ha) %b Average (ha)
Azuay 2 215 4.13 17 0.06 0.08
Bolivar 19 725 13.93 1,963 7.21 2.71
Cañar 6 126 2.42 474 1.74 3.76
Chimborazo 51 1,896 36.43 17,258 63.37 9.10
Cotopaxi 20 975 18.74 5,028 18.46 5.16
Imbabura 9 716 13.76 976 3.58 1.36
Loja 4 37 0.71 60 0.22 1.62
Pichincha 4 110 2.11 1,326 4.87 12.05
Tungurahua 10 404 7.76 130 0.48 0.32
Total 125 5,204 100.00 27,232 100.00 5.23
Source: My own elaboration based on Navarro et al. (1996, p. 142).
aMembers as % of total.
bLand as % of total.
24Interview: Indigenous leader, Riobamba, December 13, 2018.
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of Guamote were located along the floor of the valley where the most productive land is located.25 The FEPP initia-
tive enabled some indigenous peasants to obtain land that was previously out of their reach. One of the participants
in the programme who I interviewed offered a similar account.26 He said that indigenous families and communities
in Guamote used various tactics to persuade hacendados to sell-up in the 1980s, including protests, occupations and
strikes. The 1990 levantamiento tipped the balance and forced reluctant hacendados to sell the remaining sections of
their haciendas. The organization he helped establish turned to FEPP to obtain funds to purchase land having
exhausted all other options. Another participant in the scheme who I interviewed painted a similar picture in the
neighbouring canton of Tixan.27 He explained how indigenous families and communities forced the sale of the
remaining sections of a hacienda lower down the valley through decades of collective organization and mobiliza-
tion.28 The FEPP loan enabled them to purchase the rest of the hacienda, including the buildings and machinery.
More broadly, however, the bulk of the most productive land remained out of the programme's reach.29 Nearly
two-thirds of land purchased through the scheme was located in Chimborazo, where land is typically less productive
and more remote than in Cotopaxi, Imbabura and Pichincha (Table 2). Mirroring land reform, the land channelled
through the initiative also included a significant amount of páramo (Goodwin, 2017). For example, most of the
10,950 ha of land acquired by one indigenous organization in Chimborazo comprised páramo (Navarro et al., 1996,
pp. 150–152). This single transaction accounted for over one-third of the total amount of land purchased through
the scheme in the highland region between 1990 and 1995.30
Insistence on the collective purchase of land was another important feature of the FEPP programme. Collective
organization was a precondition for participating, and credit was only extended to communities, associations and
cooperatives. What's more, participants were required to work land collectively until the loans were repaid. New
organizations were often formed to access loans and manage the land. With the price and amount of land restricting
wider involvement, these organizations were established within existing communities as not all community members
were willing or able to participate (Cervone, 2012; Navarro et al., 1996). In addition to contributing to social differen-
tiation within indigenous communities, this added to the diversification of local-level indigenous organization, which
tended to undermine traditional community authorities and complicate indigenous organization and mobilization
(Bretón, 2015a, 2015b; Colloredo-Mansfield, 2009; Martínez, 1995; Sánchez-Parga, 1989).
Though well-intentioned, the requirement to purchase and work land collectively reflected a romantic vision of
indigenous peasants that departed from reality in most highland indigenous communities in the late 20th century.
With the exception of páramo, as explained in the previous section, land was generally owned at the family rather
than the community level. Indigenous families were bound together by a web of communal practices and relations;
however, agricultural production was generally carried out within the family and little agricultural land was farmed at
the community level, especially by the 1990s. Thus, the model of land tenure and agricultural production imposed by
the programme was alien to most indigenous peasants. This helps explain why virtually all the organizations divided
their land soon after repaying their loans (Navarro et al., 1996, pp. 209–211; Cervone, 2012, p. 76). Yet this land
tended to remain within the community or family. The FEPP report that decisions to divide the land were not based
on the desire to offer it for sale on the open market (Navarro et al., 1996, pp. 209–211). Inheritance was given as
one of the principal reasons, indicating the continued importance of the family as a mechanism of land distribution.
The FEPP coordinator I interviewed emphasized this point. He told me that only in very few cases had indigenous
peasants decided to sell land, and when they did, it had been exchanged with family members—a ‘brother’ or ‘uncle’
not ‘outsiders’.31 He believed that the decision to divide land was based on the desire of indigenous peoples to
25Interview: Regional Coordinator, FEPP, Riobamba, August 5, 2010.
26Interview: Indigenous leader, Guamote, December 14, 2018.
27Interview: Indigenous leader, Riobamba, December 13, 2018.
28I was told a similar account of land struggles inTixan by another indigenous leader during a visit to the canton in August 2017. For a detailed analysis of
indigenous land struggles and politics in Tixan, see Cervone (2012).
29On a national level, FEPP classified 10% of the land purchased through the scheme as ‘highly productive’, 61% as ‘medium quality’ and 29% as ‘poor
quality’ (Navarro et al., 1996, p. 193).
30Note that this transaction significantly skews upward the average land sizes reported inTable 2.
31Interview: Regional Coordinator, FEPP, Riobamba, August 5, 2010.
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undertake agriculture according to their own forms of organization, reflecting the impulse for autonomy among high-
land indigenous communities. Both the participants I interviewed reported a similar pattern and expressed similar
sentiments, with virtually all the land remaining within their communities after it was divided.32 Thus, land purchased
through the FEPP programme tended to remain under indigenous control and regulated through family and commu-
nity institutions.
To sum up, although some indigenous peasants obtained productive land through the FEPP programme, most of
the best quality land remained out of their reach, especially where capital-intensive agroexporters operated. The ini-
tiative reflected the broader pattern that emerged in the highlands in the late 20th century, with the activation of
land markets creating space for indigenous peasants to secure land and the development of land markets closing
them down. The programme also increased social and class differentiation within indigenous communities, which
was another key feature of this process. The outcomes of these historical processes have important implications for
indigenous land struggles in the early 21st century. I turn to this point below.
4 | CONCLUSION: LAND MARKETS AND STRUGGLES IN THE EARLY
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Land reform triggered a series of interconnected processes in Highland Ecuador in the late 20th century which
expanded the role the market performed in regulating the distribution and value of land, and converted the land mar-
ket into a site of social and political struggle. Through the lens of the activation-development concept, I have shown
that this created opportunities and problems for highland indigenous peasants. On the one hand, the activation of
the land market created spaces for them to obtain land, especially in the central highland province of Chimborazo.
There and elsewhere, sustained collective organization and mobilization were required to unlock land markets and
persuade elites to sell. The private land that indigenous peasants purchased was then typically, if not exclusively, cir-
culated through family and community institutions rather than exchanged freely on the market. On the other hand,
the development of the land market closed down spaces for them to obtain land as market prices played a progres-
sively larger role in regulating the distribution and value of rural land. This process was evident across the highlands,
but it was particularly acute in the northern provinces of Imbabura, Pichincha and Cotopaxi, where capital-intensive
agroexport expanded in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, the development of the land market was closely connected to
the world economy.
Taking a longer-term view of the interaction between the activation and development of the land market shows
the former playing a contradictory role in the latter. On one side, activation increased the amount of land under
indigenous control and underpinned indigenous land mobilizations in the late 20th century. This challenged the
development of land markets by increasing the amount of land circulated through family and community institutions
and supporting a countermovement that attempted to decommodify land (Goodwin, 2017). On the other side, acti-
vation created space for the accumulation of land and capital among highland indigenous peasants, which increased
social and class differentiation and promoted and embedded capitalist agriculture. Over time, this ultimately aided
the development of the land market by supporting capitalist relations, strengthening private property rights, and
complicating broad-based land mobilizations. Indigenous participation in the land market in the late 20th century
therefore contributed to the weakening of the countermovement in the early 21st century.
One of the clearest illustrations of the waning of indigenous involvement in this countermovement came during
Rafael Correa's decade in power (2007–2017).33 Building on important declarations about the regulation and
32Interview: Indigenous leader, Riobamba, December 13, 2018; Indigenous leader, Guamote, December 14, 2018.
33Note that here I am referring to highland indigenous involvement in the countermovement that emerged under land reform to regulate and delimit the
rural land market and protect and expand alternative forms of organization and exchange (Goodwin, 2017). Highland indigenous involvement in
countermovements against fictitious commodification have remained strong in other spheres, including water and mining. See Goodwin (2018) for
conceptual reflections on these forms of resistance and contention.
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distribution of land in the 2008 constitution, a coalition of indigenous and peasant movements—Red Agraria
Nacional—developed a legislative proposal that sought to limit the reach and influence of the rural land market
(Goodwin, 2017; Red Agraria Nacional, 2012). Yet the coalition excluded CONAIE, the chief protaganist in national
land mobilizations in the 1980s and 1990s and the biggest indigenous movement in Ecuador, and little pressure was
placed on the government to introduce a radical new land law.34 Multiple factors contributed to CONAIE's absence
from the coalition, including Correa's efforts to weaken and divide the indigenous movement, but outcomes of his-
torical land struggles were pivotal, especially increased social and class differentiation within the highland indigenous
population (Goodwin, 2017; Henderson, 2017, 2018).
Other factors have overlapped with these developments to reconfigure indigenous land relations and struggles
in the early 21st century. The unequal distribution of land and water, the crisis of small-scale agriculture, and the
allure of urban life have encouraged growing numbers of indigenous peoples to abandon agriculture and seek
employment in towns and cities (Berry, Kay, Martínez, & North, 2014; Colloredo-Mansfield, 2009; Goodwin, 2019;
Horn, 2018; Rayner, 2017). Highland indigenous peoples who live in urban areas generally retain strong links with
rural families and communities; however, their connection to rural land and engagement in rural communal activities
have weakened. In some cases, the direction of travel has been reversed as expanding towns and cities have come
to rural indigenous communities, which has increased the economic value of land and created stronger incentives to
offer it for sale on the market.35 Tourism has also triggered rapid land price rises, stoking tensions within and
between indigenous communities in some zones (Gascón, 2016). In other areas, tourism has created new economic
opportunities for some rural indigenous families and communities, leading to a distancing from agrarian struggles and
indigenous movements (Lyall, Colloredo-Mansfeld, & Quick, 2020). Participation in the agroindustrial sector has also
influenced indigenous land relations and struggles. Offering the prospect of a relatively high and stable income,
labouring on flower plantations has become commonplace for indigenous men and women in the northern highlands,
even if the work is associated with serious health problems due to extreme working conditions and extensive use of
chemicals (Korovkin, 2004; Martínez, 2013; Martínez & Martínez, 2019; Rubio, 2008). Elevated land prices in zones
where flower plantations operate make it extremely hard for indigenous labourers to invest in productive land,
whereas the crisis of small-scale agriculture offers few incentives to dedicate time and resources to cultivation. Indig-
enous engagement in the flower sector has also complicated the efforts of indigenous communities and movements
to mobilize around land and added to social and class differentiation within the highland indigenous population
(Soper, 2019).
The hybrid land regime that emerged in the late 20th century through the activation and development of the
land market has been reconfigured through these changes. Highland indigenous peoples continue to circulate land
through family and community institutions, including in urban areas in some cases (Rayner, 2017; Rayner &
Merida, 2019).36 However, distribution through the family has become even more difficult due to the lack of land
available to most indigenous families and the extensive subdivision of land through marriage and inheritance
(Martínez, 2002; Radcliffe, 2015). Meanwhile, community authorities and relations have come under strain due to
increased social and class differentiation, temporary and permanent migration, and the proliferation of local organiza-
tions. The land market continues to exist alongside forms of exchange based around the family and community. Yet
its role in regulating the distribution and value of land has become progressively larger as capitalist agriculture and
relations have spread and private property rights have become more prevalent and entrenched.
Thus, the land market has become increasingly dominant in rural Highland Ecuador over the last two decades.
Yet land has not been stripped of its fictional status as commodity. It remains enmeshed in social, cultural and
34In the event, the Correa administration introduced a new land law—Ley Orgánica de Tierras Rurales y Territorios Ancestrales—which was far removed from
the Red Agraria Nacional proposal (RO 7112016). Although this legislation, which supersedes and annuls Ley de Desarrollo Agrario, provides protection for
communal land, it places few meaningful restrictions on land markets.
35Interview: Indigenous leader, Guamote, December 14, 2018.
36The role family and community institutions perform in regulating the exchange of rural land was highlighted during my discussions with highland
indigenous communities and leaders in the 2010s, especially in the province of Chimborazo.
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political institutions, has multiple meanings and values and is instilled with basic properties that differentiate it from
genuine commodities. However, the evolution of the land market and indigenous struggles show political tensions
connected to the fictional qualities of land change over time. Recent literature on land relations and agrarian change
elsewhere in the Global South points in a similar direction (e.g., Ferguson, 2013; Li, 2014; Naybor, 2015; Sud, 2019).
I suggest a simple modification to the fictitious commodities concept which seeks to improve its analytical power in
light of these insights. The refinement involves differentiating between the intrinsic and variable fictional dimensions
of land as commodity. The former refers to the fundamental characteristics of land that distinguish it from genuine
commodities. For example, land cannot be manufactured to respond to increases in demand. The latter relates to
mutable dimensions—meanings, values, functions—that differ between social groups and classes and take distinct
forms in different social and historical contexts. The intrinsic and variable fictional dimensions of land as commodity
are simultaneously present in processes of land commodification and have a significant bearing on agrarian politics.
For instance, intrinsic characteristics compel capitalist states to create and sustain land markets, including eradicating
or weakening alternative forms of exchange, which generates political conflict. Meanwhile, variable dimensions stoke
political tensions as different social groups and classes attempt to impose their meanings and values of land on the
state and law (Goodwin, 2017). The Ecuadorian case shows that these struggles take particular forms at different his-
torical moments and political tensions connected to intrinsic and variable dimensions shift as capitalism evolves.
Unpacking the fictitiousness of land as commodity therefore encourages eschewing static, essentialized readings of
land commodification and viewing it as a dynamic, contextual process. Viewing fictitious commodification from this
perspective cautions against seeing the development of land markets as a linear or teleological process. Indeed, Karl
Polanyi's claim that creating land markets was one of the ‘weirdest of all the undertakings of our ancestors’ might
well become increasingly prophetic as the social and ecological limits of land markets are reached and current and
future generations search for more sophisticated institutions to manage land and mediate human-nature relations.
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